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 Abstract
A key ingredient of many popular asset pricing models is that investors exhibit coun-
tercyclical risk aversion, which helps explain major economic puzzles such as the 
strong and systematic variation in risk premiums over time and the high volatility 
of asset prices. There is, however, surprisingly little evidence for this assumption 
because it is difficult to control for the host of factors that change simultaneously 
during financial booms and busts. We circumvent these control problems by priming 
financial professionals with either a boom or a bust scenario and by subsequently 
measuring their risk aversion in two experimental investment tasks with real monetary 
stakes. Subjects who were primed with a financial bust were substantially more risk 
averse than those who were primed with a boom. Subjects were also more fearful 
in the bust than in the boom condition, and their fear is negatively related to invest-
ments in the risky asset, suggesting that fear may play an important role in counter-
cyclical risk aversion. The mechanism described in this paper is relevant for theory 
and has important implications, as it provides the basis for a self-reinforcing process 
that amplifies market dynamics.
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I Introduction
One of the major puzzles in ﬁnancial economics is the fact that risk premiums of many
asset classes vary strongly and systematically over time. In particular, the equity risk
premium seems to be higher during recessions than in business cycle peaks. Over the
past decades a high price-dividend ratio of U.S. stocks preceded several years of low
returns and vice versa (Shiller 1981; Campbell and Shiller 1988a,b; Cochrane 2011).
To account for this pervasive pattern, asset pricing models have evolved that assume
that investors exhibit countercyclical risk aversion. In these models, investors are less
risk averse during ﬁnancial booms compared to busts. Investors in consumption-based
asset pricing models derive utility from consumption relative to a habit or subsistence
level of consumption (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane 1999) and become more risk averse
as asset prices decline and consumption approaches the habit level. In the model of
Barberis et al. (2001), utility depends not only on consumption, but also on recent in-
vestment performance relative to some historical benchmark. They assume that future
losses are psychologically more painful if recent investments yielded a relatively poor
performance. As Mehra (2012) recently pointed out, however, the question whether
investors actually exhibit countercyclical risk aversion as postulated in these models
remains open. We address this gap in empirical knowledge by providing evidence in
favor of countercyclical risk aversion.1 Our evidence is based on the risk taking be-
havior of ﬁnancial market professionals in a controlled experimental environment that
provides a measure of subjects’ risk aversion.
In view of the diﬃculties in identifying countercyclical risk aversion, it is not sur-
prising that only limited evidence exists to date. A key issue is ﬁnding ceteris paribus
variation in ﬁnancial market trends. Using actual market data can be problematic
because behavior in booms and busts is simultaneously aﬀected by many factors that
are often diﬃcult to measure. For example, a decline in asset prices is generally asso-
ciated with changes in subjective expected asset returns, asset price volatility, overall
ﬁnancial wealth, changes in habits, and background risks that may or may not be cor-
related with asset prices (Calvet and Sodini 2014; Beaud and Willinger forthcoming).
This makes inferring risk aversion from actual asset holdings extremely challenging.
For example, in the absence of good expectations data, holding a low share of risky
assets may reﬂect investors’ high risk aversion or their pessimistic expectations for
future returns (e.g., Malmendier and Nagel 2011). In addition, there is evidence
suggesting that inertia governs household asset allocation, i.e., households re-balance
their portfolios only slowly in response to capital gains and losses, implying that their
portfolio contains too many or too few risky assets for a given level of risk aversion
(e.g., Agnew et al. 2003; Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008).
We circumvent these measurement and identiﬁcation problems in this paper by
directly measuring the willingness to take ﬁnancial risks in a controlled task - adapted
from Gneezy and Potters (1997) - with real ﬁnancial stakes: subjects received an
initial endowment of 200 Swiss francs (about 220 USD) and decided how much to
1We deﬁne countercyclical risk aversion as a lower willingness to buy identical risky assets (i.e.,
assets with an identical price, identical objective asset returns and identical subjective expectation
about these asset returns) in a bust relative to a boom. Subjects who behave in this way apply a
higher risk discount to the same assets (i.e., they exhibit higher risk aversion) in the bust compared
to the boom treatment.
2invest in a risky asset with a positive expected return, and how much to put on a
risk-free account with a zero interest rate. Our subjects are ﬁnancial professionals
who trade assets privately and professionally. One of our investment tasks serves as a
measurement tool for risk aversion - the risk task - where we have perfect control over
subjects’ expected returns and the risks they face because we determine (and subjects
know) the probabilities and payoﬀs in the task. In contrast, in the other investment
task - the ambiguity task - subjects do not know the precise probabilities, but we
control for their expectations by explicitly measuring them.
Instead of measuring subjects’ risk taking in a real ﬁnancial boom and bust, which
is associated with all the measurement and identiﬁcation problems mentioned above,
we primed half of the subjects with a stock market boom and the other half with a
stock market bust. We primed subjects by asking them to ﬁll out a survey before they
participated in the investment tasks and they were shown a ﬁctive graph of asset prices
in one part of the survey that resembled a stock market boom or a bust, respectively.
We then asked them group-speciﬁc general questions about their investment strategy
during either a boom or a bust, depending on which group they were in. In this way,
we mentally activated the concept of a ﬁnancial boom or bust, i.e., we rendered it
mentally salient.
Priming is a well-established and frequently used method in psychology and refers to
the mental activation of the primed concepts (Bargh and Chartrand 2000). In recent
years, priming has also been increasingly used in economics and ﬁnance.2 Priming
enables the measurement of the pure psychological impact of the primed concepts
on behavior (and emotions and cognition) in subsequent tasks. This technique al-
lows us to measure the psychological impact of booms and busts on risk preferences
without the confounding inﬂuence of background risk, wealth eﬀects, changing habits,
experienced gains or losses, unknown returns, and volatility expectations, because all
these variables remain unchanged across conditions. In other words, subjects in the
boom and bust condition face exactly identical choice problems, and random assign-
ment to conditions ensures that the two treatment groups are statistically identical.
Thus, any behavioral diﬀerence in average risk taking across conditions identiﬁes the
psychological impact of boom versus bust on subjects’ risk preferences.
Our results show that ﬁnancial professionals take substantially fewer risks when they
are primed with a ﬁnancial bust as opposed to a boom. When the probabilities with
which diﬀerent payoﬀs arose are perfectly known (risk task), they invest on average 22
percent less into the risky asset in the bust condition (45 percent of the endowment)
than in the boom condition (58 percent of the endowment). When subjects do not
have perfect information about probabilities (ambiguity task), we observe a similar
17 percent reduction in the amount allocated to the risky asset in the bust treatment.
Because the priming could, in principle, also aﬀect subjects’ expectations about the
probability of the good state of the world in the ambiguity task, we also measured
these expectations. However, the priming did not aﬀect expectations. We thus un-
ambiguously observe a countercyclical willingness to take risks, i.e., priming subjects
2For example, Gilad and Kliger (2008) primed ﬁnancial professionals using a ﬁctive story about
a person gambling in the casino. See also Benjamin et al. (2010), Cohn et al. (2013), and Callen
et al. (2014) for recent priming studies examining the respective inﬂuence of social identity or violent
trauma on economic preferences.
3with a bust condition increases their risk aversion relative to the boom prime.3
In view of previous studies (e.g., List and Haigh 2005; Cipriani and Guarino 2009)
suggesting that psychological forces are attenuated in more experienced market par-
ticipants, we further examined whether participants with less market experience drive
the priming eﬀect. We ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between subjects
with diﬀerent market experience. If anything, market experience tends to increase
the susceptibility to booms and busts.4 Further analysis suggests that the speciﬁc
emotion of fear may play a critical role in countercyclical risk aversion. Subjects
in the bust condition exhibited a signiﬁcantly higher level of fear than those in the
boom condition. We also ﬁnd that higher levels of fear predict a signiﬁcantly lower
investment in the risky asset.
The idea that fear may be related to risk taking has been recognized previously in the
psychological literature. For example, Lerner and Keltner (2001) found in a correlation
study that more fearful individuals are less willing to take risks in a hypothetical
choice situation (i.e., in the Asian disease problem). However, evidence for a causal
relationship between fear and risk preferences when decisions have real monetary
consequences remains scarce.5 In order to study the causal impact of fear on ﬁnancial
risk taking, we conducted a further experiment in which we exposed experimental
subjects to fear from random electric shocks during an investment task. All subjects
faced low and high fear trials, enabling us to control for individual diﬀerences in risk
taking and fear perception. A high (low) fear level was implemented by informing
subjects that they would receive painful (mild and painless) random electric shocks
during the next three investment trials.6 When participants were exposed to low levels
of fear, they were willing to take signiﬁcantly higher risks than when they were subject
to high levels of fear. Interestingly, not the actual shock itself but the expectation of
receiving a painful shock during the task diminished risk taking in this study. Taken
together, the combined evidence from the priming and the fear induction experiment
thus suggests that the emotion of fear may play an important role in countercyclical
risk aversion.
Our ﬁndings contribute to several strands of the literature. Most importantly, we
provide direct support for countercyclical risk aversion, which is a key ingredient of
asset pricing models that aim to explain the high volatility of asset prices and the
countercyclical risk premium for equity (Campbell and Cochrane 1999; Barberis et al.
2001).7 Higher risk aversion during a bust directly implies that households demand
3The prime could also aﬀect subjects’ ambiguity aversion in the ambiguity task. However, as an
increase in ambiguity aversion also represents a reduction in the willingness to invest in the risky
asset, we use the term risk aversion for both for convenience.
4In a similar vein, Haigh and List (2005) ﬁnd that professional traders exhibit more myopic loss
aversion than students.
5See, for example, Lee and Andrade (2011) and Lin et al. (2012). In these papers fear is induced
exogenously in a market setting where it can aﬀect both subjects’ risk preferences and their beliefs
about others behavior. Thus, if fear induces behavioral changes, this can be due to changes in
subjects’ risk preferences or changes in their expectations about other market participants’ behavior.
6We also measured ex-ante each subject’s individual pain threshold in order to be able to calibrate
painless and painful electric shocks for each individual.
7There have been several attempts in the literature to validate the consumption based habit model
by testing one particular prediction of the model. In this model, habits imply that lower wealth is
associated with higher risk aversion. Existing studies produced mixed evidence (Brunnermeier and
Nagel 2008; Calvet et al. 2009; Chiappori and Paiella 2011). These studies typically rely on the
4a high equity risk premium, while the required risk premium is lower during a boom.
In addition, our ﬁndings provide a rationale for self-reinforcing feedback loops that
amplify market dynamics and generate excess volatility. For example, a decline in
stock prices could evoke feelings of fear among investors, rendering them more risk
averse. This may lead to the sale of stocks (i.e., panic sales), which then creates
additional downward momentum for the prices. Likewise, a stock market boom could
be ampliﬁed through a reduction in fear and risk aversion.
The fact that booms and busts aﬀect subjects’ fear diﬀerently and that fear may
directly aﬀect their risk preferences has potentially intriguing implications for how
economists should model the individual. In standard theory, expectations typically
do not aﬀect preferences. If, however, price expectations aﬀect fear levels, they may
also directly aﬀect risk preferences. In this context, we would like to emphasize that
nothing in our ﬁndings rules out that expectations may also have a direct amplifying
eﬀect on market dynamics. If, for example, a substantial share of traders has optimistic
price expectations during a boom, this may not only increase their investments in risky
assets through a decrease in risk aversion but also because they expect higher returns.8
Our evidence for time varying risk aversion may also have implications that go be-
yond providing an explanation for countercyclical risk premiums and excess volatility
in asset prices. Cochrane (2011) pointed out that time varying risk premiums have
implications for ﬁnance applications, accounting, cost of capital, capital structure,
compensation, and macroeconomics.9
Our study is also related to an interesting paper by Guiso et al. (2013) who exam-
ined time varying risk aversion. They administered a questionnaire to customers of
an Italian bank before the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007 and after the crisis in 2009. They
ﬁnd that customers reported a lower certainty equivalent for a hypothetical lottery
following the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. Due to the fact that many variables (e.g., wealth,
expectations of returns and volatility, experienced losses and gains, etc.) could have
changed simultaneously between 2007 and 2009, the authors face the diﬃcult task
of controlling for them by ﬁnding appropriate proxies. Our study diﬀers from theirs
by randomly assigning ﬁnancial professionals to a boom or bust condition. While
our priming approach ensures that there are no observable or unobservable diﬀer-
ences between the subjects in the two conditions, it also comes with the potential
drawback that behavior and emotions are not measured during an actual boom and
bust. Instead, we merely rendered the state of a boom or a bust salient in subjects’
minds. However, actual booms and busts are likely to constitute much more powerful
primes (i.e., they are emotionally more salient). It seems therefore plausible that the
inﬂuence of real booms and busts may be even stronger. Our study further diﬀers
from Guiso et al. (2013) because we measure risk aversion in an incentive compatible
assumption that risky asset holdings are a good proxy of risk aversion, making it necessary to control
for many other factors for which good proxies may be diﬃcult to ﬁnd.
8The ﬁndings in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) suggest that historical experiences may also play
a role in investment behavior. They show that individuals which experienced low stock returns in
their early lives report more pessimistic expectations of future returns and exhibit a lower willingness
to take risks even after decades. See Dillenberger and Rozen (2014) for a formal model of history-
dependent risk taking behavior.
9Cochrane (2011) uses the term time varying discount rate which includes time discounting and
the discounting of the value of risky assets because of risk aversion. In this view, time varying risk
aversion is a key cause of time varying discount rates.
5way, i.e., subjects’ decisions implied sizable ﬁnancial consequences for them. We are
aware of the concern that the size of preference parameters estimated in laboratory
experiments cannot be extrapolated to ﬁeld settings without caveats (Harrison et al.
2007; Charness et al. 2013). However, because we are interested in the comparative
static eﬀects of booms versus busts rather than the absolute levels of risk aversion, we
feel conﬁdent that our results are generalizable to ﬁeld settings.10 Finally, a notable
feature of our experiment is that, unlike in most laboratory experiments, we analyze
the behavior of ﬁnancial professionals who actively participate in ﬁnancial markets.
Overall, it is reassuring that both studies, Guiso et al. (2013) and ours, arrive at the
same conclusion: the subjective willingness to take risks is lower during a recession.
The fact that this conclusion emerges from diﬀerent studies with diﬀerent research
designs, subject pools, and methods strengthens the evidence for countercyclical risk
aversion.
Finally, our study is also related to the small but growing literature on the ef-
fects of emotional or traumatic events on risk taking and other economic behaviors
(e.g., Saunders 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003; Knutson et al. 2008; Kuhnen and
Knutson 2011; Lin et al. 2012; Bassi et al. 2013; Cameron and Shah 2013; Callen et al.
2014). This literature generally suggests that emotional and/or traumatic events can
have considerable eﬀects on preferences and behavior. Although these studies sug-
gest that emotionally signiﬁcant events can aﬀect preferences, none of them examines
countercyclical risk aversion, i.e., how booms and busts aﬀect risk preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the experi-
mental design. Section III describes the sample and presents a randomization check.
Section IV summarizes the empirical ﬁndings, and Section V concludes the paper.
II Experimental Design
We conducted the experiment at a large ﬁnancial trade fair where exhibitors presented
their ﬁnancial products and services. We installed a mobile laboratory in a quiet corner
of the fairground, ensuring that the experiment was run under controlled conditions.
To investigate the behavior of real ﬁnancial market participants, we recruited our
subjects on the day when the trade fair was only open to ﬁnancial professionals.
Subjects were asked to ﬁll out a short computerized ﬁnancial market survey in which
they could earn money.11 The computer stations were separated by partition walls to
guarantee privacy (see Figure A1 in the appendix).
The ﬁrst part of the survey contained a few icebreaker questions. The second part
comprised our key experimental manipulation. The computer randomly assigned sub-
jects to one of two treatments. In treatment “Boom”, subjects ﬁrst saw an animated,
ﬁctive chart of a booming stock market (see left panel of Figure 1). They subsequently
answered ﬁve questions about their investment strategy during a stock market boom
(e.g., “Imagine you ﬁnd yourself in a continuing stock market boom and you expect
the development to continue as indicated by the arrow in the picture. Would you buy
10Many studies found signiﬁcant correlations between lottery choices and ﬁeld behavior, including
health-related behaviors (Anderson and Mellor 2008; Sutter et al. 2013), career choices (Masclet et al.
2009; Bellemare and Shearer 2010), and ﬁnancial decisions (Dohmen et al. 2011; Guiso et al. 2013;
Vieider et al. forthcoming).
11The instructions for the investment task and the survey are available upon request.
6or sell particular stocks? Explain your answer brieﬂy.”). In treatment “Bust”, subjects
faced the opposite situation, i.e., a stock market bust (see right panel of Figure 1),
and answered an analogous set of questions about their investment behavior during a
bust. Following these questions, subjects reported their current emotional state. We
elicited their general aﬀective state and fear as a more speciﬁc emotion. General aﬀect
was elicited with a widely used and validated non-verbal measure, where subjects have
to select one out of nine manikins (see online appendix) which best expresses their
current aﬀective state ranging from very negative (encoded as “-4”) to very positive
(encoded as “4”) (Bradley and Lang 1994). Fear was measured by asking subjects
to report the intensity of fear on a 7-point Likert scale (Bosman and Van Winden
2002).12
Figure 1: Boom and Bust treatment
(a) Treatment Boom (b) Treatment Bust
These animated charts were used to increase the mental saliency of ﬁnancial booms and busts. We
deliberately did not label the time and price axes to prevent subjects from thinking about a speciﬁc
stock market event, but about booms and busts in general. The orange arrows were used to illustrate
that the market trends were not expected to revert in the near future.
Subjects could subsequently earn up to 500 Swiss francs (or 546 US dollars at the
time of the experiment) in an investment task (adapted from Gneezy and Potters
1997). They were endowed with 200 Swiss francs and decided how much to invest in a
risky asset. If the good state of the world occurred, subjects won two and a half times
the invested amount. If the bad state occurred, subjects lost the invested amount.
The remaining amount that was not invested in the risky asset was automatically
credited to a safe account with a zero interest rate. We implemented two variants
of the investment task, which diﬀered only by the extent to which subjects knew the
probability of success for the risky asset. In the risk task, subjects knew the probability
of success. They saw a picture of a plastic box on their computer screens which
contained one red and one yellow ball (see left panel of Figure A2 in the appendix).
12Self-reported emotional experiences have been shown to be consistently correlated with diﬀerent
physiological measures such as heart rate and facial muscle contraction (Bradley and Lang 2000).
7The real box was visibly placed on the instructor’s table and used to determine whether
the good or the bad state occurred for each subject. At the end of the experiment, the
instructor drew one of the two balls blindly. If the yellow ball was drawn, the good
state occurred, i.e., the risky investment was successful. In the ambiguity task, the
probability of success for the risky asset was uncertain for the subjects. We introduced
uncertainty using a second plastic box ﬁlled with a large, unknown number of blue,
red, and yellow balls (see right panel of Figure A2 in the appendix). Analogous to
the risk task, the good state occurred if a yellow ball was drawn at the end of the
experiment. We set the share of yellow balls at 50 percent, i.e., at the same level as
in the risk task. After the ambiguity task, subjects guessed the share of yellow balls,
which provides a measure of their expectations.
The ﬁnal part of the survey included a question on general optimism borrowed from
the standard Life Orientation Test, a commonly used test in psychology (Scheier et al.
1994). Subjects indicated the extent to which they agreed with the statement “Overall,
I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.” on a 7-point Likert scale. We
used this question as a second, more general measure of expectations. Subjects next
completed a ﬁnancial literacy test. We created our own test because existing ﬁnancial
literacy tests were primarily developed for the general population (e.g., van Rooij et al.
2011). Our ﬁnancial literacy test is a multiple choice test and asked subjects to rank
order diﬀerent ﬁnancial products according to their volatility, identify the advantages
of traded funds, select the correct term for purchasing a put option, and ﬁnally,
to recognize which companies are currently listed on the Swiss Market Index. The
survey concluded with questions collecting information on subjects’ socio-economic
backgrounds.
Several features of the experimental design are noteworthy. First, the risk task,
where subjects knew the exact probability of success, was always presented after
the ambiguity task. This prevented them from using the probability of success in
the risk task as an anchor for their decisions in the ambiguity task (e.g., Tversky
and Kahneman 1974). Second, it was common knowledge that only one of the two
investment decisions would become payoﬀ relevant. The instructor drew a ball from
the small or the large box for each subject. Which box was used was determined
randomly by the computer at the end of the survey. This prevented subjects from
pursuing hedging strategies across decisions (e.g., Blanco et al. 2010). Finally, due
to budget constraints, we randomly selected 20 percent of the subjects for actual
payment at the end of the survey.13 The payment modality was common knowledge.
Considering that the survey took only about 15 minutes to complete, the stake size
was nevertheless quite sizable.
III Descriptive statistics and randomization check
A Descriptive statistics
Table A1 presents the summary statistics of our sample consisting of 162 ﬁnancial
professionals. Their average age was 36.4 years. 75 percent were male. Their average
13Payment schemes with random components are commonly used in experiments on individual
decision-making and there is solid evidence showing that these schemes do not change behavior
(Starmer and Sugden 1991; Cubitt et al. 1998; Hey and Lee 2005).
8monthly income was 11’041 Swiss francs, which is representative for Switzerland’s
ﬁnancial industry (Oﬃce 2010). 54 percent of the participants owned liquid assets
worth 100’000 Swiss francs or more. Many worked as ﬁnancial advisors, but the sam-
ple also covers other typical professional functions in the ﬁnancial industry, such as
traders, analysts, and product managers.14 More than half of the participants indi-
cated that they trade assets at least once per month. We ﬁnd individual heterogeneity
in ﬁnancial literacy, but overall, the level of ﬁnancial knowledge was rather high. 64
percent correctly solved three or all four problems in the ﬁnancial literacy test, while
only 11 percent ended up with a score of one or zero. This heterogeneity in ﬁnancial
literacy is related to market participation: subjects who reported trading assets fre-
quently achieved a higher test score compared to those who indicated they were less
active in ﬁnancial markets (p = 0.013, t-test).15
B Randomization check
We tested whether the computerized randomization successfully resulted in a balanced
sample using rank-sum tests, or 2-tests in case of binary variables. With the excep-
tion of male subjects being slightly over-represented in treatment Boom (p = 0.069,
2-test), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the socio-economic and ﬁnancial
background of the subjects is balanced between treatments based on conventional sig-
niﬁcance levels (see Table A1 in the appendix). We always control for gender in our
regression analysis.
IV Experimental results
A Investment decisions
Figure 2 displays the average investment share in the risky asset by treatment. In both
variants of the investment task, subjects made considerably more conservative invest-
ment decisions in treatment Bust compared to treatment Boom. Panel A presents the
treatment eﬀect in the risk task. Investments into the risky asset decreased on average
by 22 percent from an investment share of 57.7 percent in treatment Boom down to
45.2 percent in treatment Bust. The treatment eﬀect is similar in the ambiguity task,
as shown in Panel B. The share invested in the risky asset is on average 50.3 percent
in treatment Boom compared to 41.9 percent in treatment Bust, which corresponds
to a 17 percent reduction in risk taking.
In order to underpin the treatment diﬀerences statistically and to control for individ-
ual diﬀerences in socio-economic and ﬁnancial background, we conducted a regression
analysis. Our regression model is speciﬁed as follows:
yik = 0 + 1Bustik + 2Ambiguityi + 3Xi + ik; (1)
where the dependent variable yik is the share individual i invested in the risky asset
(in percent of the endowment) in investment task k. Bustik is a dummy for treatment
14The job function question was asked in open format and therefore does not permit a precise
classiﬁcation of professional functions in some cases.
15We report two-sided p-values throughout the entire paper.
9Figure 2: Booms, busts and investment decisions
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The ﬁgure shows average investments in the risk task (Panel A), and the ambiguity task (Panel B),
by treatments. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
Bust, and Ambiguityi is a dummy for decisions made in the ambiguity task. We esti-
mate an alternative model where we include the interaction term BustikAmbiguityi.
This allows us to examine whether treatment Bust had a diﬀerential impact on invest-
ments in the two variants of the task. Xi is the set of control variables for subjects’
socio-economic and ﬁnancial backgrounds. We control for age, gender, ﬁnancial liter-
acy, and trading frequency.16 Finally, ik is the idiosyncratic error term. We estimate
our regression model using OLS and correct the standard errors for clustering at the
individual level. The results are the same if we use a Tobit model instead.
The estimation results reported in Table 1 corroborate our main ﬁnding. Column
(1) reveals that investments are signiﬁcantly lower in treatment Bust than in treatment
Boom (p = 0.020, t-test). This diﬀerence also holds if we include the interaction term
between treatment Bust and the ambiguity task, as shown in column (2). According
to this model, in the risk task, subjects invested on average 12 percentage point less
in the risky asset in treatment Bust compared to treatment Boom (p = 0.012, t-
16Due to item non-response, we do not use the income and wealth measures as control variables
in the regression analysis. Both measures are uncorrelated with risk taking and the results are
qualitatively the same if we include these variables.
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Table 1: Regression analysis of investment decisions
Dependent variable: Share invested in risky asset
(1) (2)
Bust -9.827** -11.879**
(4.177) (4.699)
Bust  Ambiguity 4.106
(4.544)
Ambiguity -5.407** -7.359**
(2.255) (2.891)
Age -0.080 -0.080
(0.188) (0.188)
Male 5.181 5.181
(4.153) (4.160)
Financial literacy 0.660 0.660
(2.470) (2.474)
High trading frequency -1.766 -1.766
(4.439) (4.446)
Constant 54.585*** 55.561***
(8.676) (8.706)
N 324 324
This table reports OLS coeﬃcient estimates (robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the
individual level in parentheses). The dependent variable is the share invested in the risky asset
(in percent of the endowment). “Bust” is a dummy for treatment Bust. “Ambiguity” is a dummy
indicating decisions from the ambiguity task. The interaction term “Bust  Ambiguity” allows the
treatment eﬀect to diﬀer across the two variants of the investment task. “Age” is the individual’s age
in years, and “Male” is a gender dummy. “Financial literacy” is the score on the ﬁnancial literacy
test, ranging from 0 to 4. “High trading frequency” is a dummy for individuals who trade assets at
least once per month. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
test). The interaction term between treatment Bust and the ambiguity task is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (p = 0.368, t-test). This means that we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the treatment eﬀect is similar in both variants of the task.
We further ﬁnd that subjects invested signiﬁcantly less in the risky asset when its
success probability was uncertain (p = 0.018 in column (1) and p = 0.012 in column
(2), t-tests). This is consistent with the notion that ambiguous prospects are valued
less because of ambiguity aversion.17 The control variables for ﬁnancial knowledge
17Reduced risk taking in the ambiguity task (i.e., ambiguity aversion) could be due to pessimistic
expectations or to an aversion to ambiguous success probabilities. Subjects guessed that the share of
winning balls in the ambiguous lottery is 43.3 percent on average (95% conﬁdence interval: [41.2%,
45.4%]). Thus, they were more pessimistic in the ambiguity task than in the risk task where they knew
they would win with a probability of 50 percent. We ran an additional regression where the within-
subject diﬀerence of the investment share between the risk and the ambiguity task is regressed on
subjects’ beliefs about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery (and other control variables).
We ﬁnd a negative yet insigniﬁcant (p = 0.238, t-test) correlation between investment diﬀerences
across risk and ambiguity task and the expected number of winning balls in the ambiguity task. This
suggests that while pessimistic expectations in the ambiguity task may have lowered investments in
this task, an aversion to ambiguous success probabilities may also have played a role.
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and trading frequency have no signiﬁcant correlation with investment decisions.18
Given that some studies (e.g., List and Haigh 2005; Cipriani and Guarino 2009)
report that market experience diminishes the importance of psychological forces in
ﬁnancial decisions, we further examined whether the observed change in risk aversion
is stronger in subjects with less market experience. We used subjects’ ﬁnancial knowl-
edge and trading frequency as a proxy for their market experience. Panel A of Figure
3 presents average investments in the risk task by treatment and level of ﬁnancial
literacy. We divided the sample into two equally sized groups: subjects with below-
median ﬁnancial literacy and those above-median. The picture shows that both groups
responded similarly to our manipulation. If anything, the treatment eﬀect seems to
Figure 3: The role of market experience
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The ﬁgure displays the impact of the boom and the bust prime on average investments made in the
risk task as a function of the level of ﬁnancial literacy (Panel A), and trading frequency (Panel B).
Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
be even slightly stronger in subjects who scored higher on the ﬁnancial literacy test.
We make a similar comparison based on trading frequency in Panel B of Figure 3.
We divided the sample into two groups of roughly the same size: subjects who trade
assets at least on a monthly basis and those who trade assets less frequently. The
18We also ﬁnd that male participants tended to invest more than their female counterparts, but
not signiﬁcantly so (p = 0.214 in column (1) and p = 0.215 in column (2), t-tests).
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more active market participants exhibited a slightly more pronounced reaction, but
the diﬀerence is again not very large. A similar pattern emerges in the ambiguity task
(see Figure A3 in the appendix). We also ran OLS regressions based on model (1),
where we additionally include an interaction term between the priming condition and
ﬁnancial literacy, respectively trading frequency. The estimation results indicate that
market experience tends to enhance the treatment eﬀect, but none of the coeﬃcients
on the interaction terms reaches statistical signiﬁcance.19
B Expectations
In addition to risk aversion, expectations may be another important determinant of
peoples’ risk taking behavior. We designed the risk task in such a way that expecta-
tions should not matter. Subjects knew all parameters of this task, which eliminated
any kind of uncertainty. In contrast, the ambiguity task involved some uncertainty
because subjects did not know the share of winning balls. This enables us to study
the role of expectations in an environment that is comparable to the risk task.
The fact that we ﬁnd a similar eﬀect in both variants of the investment task is
a preliminary indication of a change in risk preferences, rather than a change in
expectations. If the mental saliency of booms and busts had an impact on subjective
expectations, we should observe a stronger treatment eﬀect in the ambiguity task
because the absence of perfect certainty about the share of winning balls leaves more
room for expectations to play a role in that task (e.g., Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and
Mukerji 2005).
In order to directly test whether our manipulation aﬀected expectations, we esti-
mated an OLS regression model in which we regressed the subjects’ guessed share of
winning balls in the ambiguity task on a dummy for treatment Bust, and our set of
control variables. Column (1) of Table 2 shows that while subjects were slightly more
pessimistic concerning the probability of success in treatment Bust than in treatment
Boom, the diﬀerence is rather small and statistically insigniﬁcant (p = 0.209, t-test).
We additionally considered the subjects’ general levels of optimism as an alternative
measure of expectations. The results in column 2 show that subjects were slightly
more optimistic in treatment Bust than in treatment Boom, although the coeﬃcient
is small and statistically insigniﬁcant (p = 0.346, t-test).20 Thus, regardless of which
measure of expectations one refers to, the ﬁndings support the key result that increas-
ing the mental saliency of booms and busts causes a change in risk aversion rather
than a change in the expectation of a successful outcome from the investment. The
reduced willingness to invest in the risky asset in the bust treatment indicates an
increase in risk aversion, i.e., a lower valuation of the risky asset for given subjective
expectations about the state of the world (the share of winning balls).
19The t-statistics and p-values for trading frequency are t = -1.02, p = 0.310 and t = -0.01,
p = 0.989 for ﬁnancial literacy. The interaction term “Bust  Ambiguity” was excluded from the
regression model.
20We also asked subjects whether they believed the Swiss Market Index (SMI) would tend to rise
or fall in the following two years and whether they thought they would lose their jobs within the
next six months. Our conclusion that the mental saliency of booms and busts did not inﬂuence
expectations remains the same if we use these alternative measures instead.
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Table 2: Regression analysis of expectations
Dependent variable: Guessed probability of success General optimism
(1) (2)
Bust -2.777 0.216
(2.203) (0.229)
Age 0.178* 0.004
(0.091) (0.011)
Male -1.505 -0.022
(2.830) (0.286)
Financial literacy 1.299 0.215*
(1.564) (0.122)
High trading frequency -1.101 -0.029
(2.183) (0.233)
Constant 36.414*** 3.548***
(5.440) (0.569)
N 162 162
This table reports OLS coeﬃcient estimates (robust standard errors in parentheses). In column (1),
the dependent variable is the guessed percentage of winning balls in the ambiguity task. In column
(2), the dependent variable is the degree of agreement to the statement “Overall, I expect more
good things to happen to me than bad.”, which ranges from 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly
agree). “Bust” is a dummy for treatment Bust. “Age” is the individual’s age in years, and “Male” is
a gender dummy. “Financial literacy” is the score on the ﬁnancial literacy test, ranging from 0 to 4.
“High trading frequency” is a dummy for individuals who trade assets at least on a biweekly basis.
Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
C Emotions
Our ﬁnal piece of evidence sheds light on the possible mechanism underlying counter-
cyclical risk aversion. Most economic theories do not explicitly model emotions such as
fear. However, this does not mean that these theories are necessarily inconsistent with
emotion-driven mechanisms. For example, the mechanism underlying countercyclical
risk aversion in Barberis et al. (2001) can be easily reconciled with the notion of fear.
In this theory, investors have a mental cushion that regulates their psychological ca-
pacity to deal with investment losses. A decline in asset prices reduces this mental
cushion and renders investors more fearful, which translates into a higher degree of
risk aversion. Likewise, the theory of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is, in principle,
also consistent with a fear based explanation. In this theory, individuals’ increase in
risk aversion after a fall in ﬁnancial wealth may arise because they fear being unable to
maintain their habitual level of consumption. The association of risk taking with fear
is also in accordance with recent brain imaging and hormone studies, which suggest
a link between a key fear processing unit of the brain (i.e., the amygdala) and risk
taking (e.g., Bossaerts 2009).21 Moreover, studies with professional traders indicate
21See also Kandasamy et al. (2013) who show that exogenously administrating the stress hormone
cortisol increases risk aversion. Furthermore, the results from Knutson et al. (2008) suggest that
activity in the nucleus accumbens (a neuronal marker for positive arousal) mediates the inﬂuence of
incidental positive emotions on subsequent risk taking. See also Apicella et al. (2014) on the role of
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that even highly trained market participants exhibit strong psychophysiological reac-
tions typically associated with strong emotions (e.g., variations in the heart rate and
the blood volume pressure) in response to price ﬂuctuations, and that these emotional
responses are related to trading performance (Lo and Repin 2002; Lo et al. 2005).
We therefore examined whether our treatments evoked diﬀerent emotional reactions,
and, in addition, whether emotions are related to investment decisions. Figure 4
visualizes treatment diﬀerences in general aﬀect and the speciﬁc emotion of fear. The
ﬁgure reveals that subjects felt generally worse (Panel A) and they also reported a
higher level of fear (Panel B) in treatment Bust compared to treatment Boom. To
Figure 4: Booms, busts and emotions
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This ﬁgure presents averages in subjects’ general aﬀect (Panel A) and fear (Panel B) in the treatments
Boom and Bust. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
examine the statistical signiﬁcance of these treatment diﬀerences, we estimated an
OLS regression model in which we separately regressed our two measures of emotions
on a dummy for treatment Bust, and our set of control variables. The estimation
results are reported in
testosterone in ﬁnancial risk taking.
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the ﬁrst two columns of Table 3. Column (1) shows that while the treatment variable
Bust is only marginally signiﬁcant in the equation for general aﬀect (p = 0.070, t-test),
the second column shows that treatment Bust caused a highly signiﬁcant increase in
fear (p = 0.023, t-test). This indicates that the priming of ﬁnancial market trends
has a causal eﬀect on the speciﬁc emotion of fear.
We also ﬁnd a stronger relationship between investment decisions and fear than
with the general aﬀective state, as columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 indicate. In these
columns, we report OLS regressions in the spirit of model (1) in Table 1, with the
diﬀerence that one of our emotion measures replaces the treatment dummy. Column
(3) shows that the coeﬃcient for general aﬀect has the expected positive sign - i.e.,
a generally more positive emotional state is associated with larger investments - but
the estimate is statistically insigniﬁcant (p = 0.147, t-test). In contrast, column (4)
shows that the relation between fear and investments is highly signiﬁcant (p = 0.017,
t-test), indicating that higher levels of fear predict lower investments in the risky asset.
Thus, taken together, we have shown that the mere priming of ﬁnancial market trends
causes signiﬁcant changes in fear and that higher levels of fear are associated with less
risk taking. To study the extent to which the treatment eﬀect is mediated by fear
we also estimated a model where we simultaneously control for treatment Bust and
our measure of fear (column 5 in Table 3). The results of this regression show that
fear reduces the share invested in the risky asset by roughly 2.7 percentage points
per “unit of fear” (p = 0.054, t-test) and that the eﬀect of Bust is reduced relative
to regression (1) in Table 1 in which we do not control for fear. Moving from “no
fear at all” to the average level of fear reduces investments by 4.4 percentage points,
which corresponds to 44.5% of the treatment eﬀect. Yet, the treatment variable is still
positive which could mean that fear does not fully mediate the treatment eﬀect, or
that there is measurement error in the fear variable. In our view, it is likely that there
is measurement error in the fear variable because emotions are notoriously diﬃcult to
measure in a precise way. Nevertheless, our measure of fear at least partly explains
the eﬀect of the bust treatment.
In order to test whether fear has a causal impact on the willingness to take ﬁnancial
risks, we conducted an additional experiment in which we exogenously induced fear
during an investment task. In psychology and neuroscience, a reliable and frequently
used method for inducing fear is to expose subjects to the threat of painful electric
shocks (Schmitz and Grillon 2012). In our experiment 41 university students partici-
pated in an investment task in which they could invest between 0 and 24 Swiss francs.
The experiment had two parts, each consisting of 42 investment trials (see appendix
B for details). In part 1 the subjects knew that on average the lotteries oﬀered a
40 to 60 percent chance of winning an equal or greater amount than the investment.
The maximum amount a lottery could return was 24 Swiss francs plus three times the
invested amount. Coarse information about the expected payoﬀ frequencies was given
at the end of part 1, where subjects were told how often they could earn a positive
return rate at the various investment levels. This means that in part 2 subjects were
much better informed about the expected distribution of returns, implying that the
ambiguity concerning the probability of success was substantially reduced. At the end
of the experiment two randomly chosen trials were paid out.
During both parts of this investment task each subject faced randomly ordered
blocks of low and high fear trials, where one block consisted of three investment trials.
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A high (low) fear level was implemented by informing subjects that they would receive
painful (painless) electric shocks that would arrive unpredictably during the next three
trials. Before the experiment, we measured individual pain thresholds so that we could
ensure that each subject received both painful and painless shocks. Subjects received
written information on their computer screens at the beginning of each block of three
trials about whether they were in a low or high pain block. In addition, they received
a reminder shock (either low or high) at the beginning of a block in order to ensure
that they were absolutely certain about the treatment condition.
The results show that in part 1 (part 2) average investment shares decreased by 7
(10) percent from 54.5 (48.7) to 50.8 (44.0) percent when subjects were exposed to a
high level of fear than when they were subject to low fear. Table B2 in the appendix
reports the OLS-regression results. We regressed the investment shares (measured in
percent of CHF 24) on the treatment condition (“Threat of shock”) and a dummy
variable “Information” indicating whether the decisions were made in part 2 after
coarse distributional information about payoﬀs was provided. In order to control for
the actual experience of electric shocks, we also included dummies for the experience of
either painful or non-painful electrical stimulation (“Painful shock” and “Non-painful
shock”) shortly before individuals made the decision in a given trial. In addition, we
control for age and gender. The regression results show that the threat of painful
shocks signiﬁcantly reduced investments (p < 0.001, t-test). Interestingly, however,
it is only the threat of a random shock, i.e., the expectation of an adverse event, and
not the previous experience of painful shocks that reduces risk taking.
These results highlight that fear per se, even if it is completely unrelated to economic
events, decreases the willingness to take risks. Thus, taken together, the facts (i)
that the priming of a bust causes fear, (ii) that this fear negatively predicts a lower
investment in risky assets, and (iii) that exogenously induced fear directly causes a
reduction in risky investments, lend coherent support to the hypothesis that fear is
one of the key mechanisms behind the changes in risk aversion during a ﬁnancial cycle.
V Conclusion
This paper presents experimental evidence on countercyclical risk aversion. We primed
ﬁnancial professionals either with the scenario of a ﬁnancial boom or a bust and
then measured their risk aversion using incentivized investment tasks. We show that
thinking of busts, as opposed to booms, substantially reduces risk taking. Because we
have perfect control over expectations about probabilities and payoﬀs in the risk task
- and good measures of expectations in the ambiguity task - we can unambiguously
attribute the behavioral change induced by the boom and bust scenarios to a change
in risk preferences. Finally, we ﬁnd evidence that fear is a plausible explanation for
why risk aversion is higher during a bust than a boom. In fact, if we exogenously
induce fear in subjects during an investment task by exposing them to the threat
of an aversive electric shock, we observe a signiﬁcant reduction in risk taking. This
suggests that fear directly causes a lower willingness to take risks even if that fear is
completely unrelated to economic events. Together, these ﬁndings support a critical
component of asset pricing models that assume countercyclical risk aversion in order
to ﬁt empirical observations of aggregate market behavior.
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Our evidence further suggests that countercyclical risk aversion might produce feed-
back loops that amplify market trends. For example, a decline in stock prices that
renders investors more fearful, and consequently, more risk averse, could lead to an
increased number of sales which pushes the prices further down. Several factors might
exacerbate this ampliﬁcation mechanism. For example, analogous to a contagious
disease, emotions may rapidly spread within investors’ social networks and amplify
emotional responses to market trends (de Gelder et al. 2004). Moreover, social pro-
jection bias - people’s tendency to project their own emotions onto others - might
have a similar reinforcing eﬀect (Lee and Andrade 2011). We believe that improv-
ing our understanding of how institutional and behavioral factors moderate such an
ampliﬁcation mechanism provides a promising avenue for future research.
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Appendix
A Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Mobile laboratory
This picture shows the mobile laboratory at the ﬁnancial trade fair.
Figure A2: Plastic boxes for the investment task
(a) Ambiguity task (b) Risk task
The pictures show the plastic boxes ﬁlled with colored balls that were used in the risk and the
ambiguity task to determine whether the good state of the world prevails. At the end of the study,
the instructors fully covered the boxes. Then one of the instructors (who could not see inside the
box) randomly picked a ball.
24
Figure A3: The role of market experience in the presence of uncertainty
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This ﬁgure displays the impact of booms and busts on average investments made in the ambiguity
task as a function of the level of ﬁnancial literacy (Panel A) and trading frequency (Panel B). Error
bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
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Table A1: Summary statistics and randomization check
Variable Total sample Boom Bust p-value
(N = 162) (N = 85) (N = 77)
Age 36.395 36.447 36.338 0.971
(10.232) (11.274) (9.015)
Male 0.753 0.812 0.688 0.069
(0.433) (0.393) (0.466)
Monthly 11’041.267 10’576.429 11’560.000 0.977
income (13’899.983) (10’582.771) (16’920.469)
Wealth 0.541 0.566 0.514 0.508
(> CHF 100’000) (0.500) (0.499) (0.503)
Financial 2.673 2.729 2.610 0.536
literacy (0.918) (0.793) (1.041)
High trading 0.519 0.541 0.494 0.544
frequency (0.501) (0.501) (0.503)
This table reports means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) in the total sample and in treat-
ments Boom and Bust. The last column displays p-values for the null hypothesis of perfect
randomization (X2 tests in case of binary variables and Mann-Whitney tests in case of interval
variables). “Age” is the individual’s age in years. “Male”, “Wealth”, and “High trading frequency”
are dummy variables indicating male subjects, asset ownership of 100’000 Swiss francs or more, and
asset trading at a monthly or more frequent rate. “Monthly income” is the monthly income in Swiss
francs. “Financial literacy” is the ﬁnancial literacy test score, ranging from 0 to 4. Due to item
non-response for the income and the wealth question, sixteen observations are missing for monthly
income, and ﬁve for wealth.
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B Fear Induction Experiment
The purpose of the additional experiment was to measure the causal impact of fear
on ﬁnancial risk taking. 41 university students participated in the experiment. We
induced diﬀerent levels of fear by informing subjects that they would receive both
mild (i.e., painless) and strong (i.e., painful) electric shocks (see Schmitz and Grillon
2012). Electrical stimulation was applied to the dorsum of the left hand in order to
deliver a maximally focused and centered tactile stimulus. Prior to the experiment,
we determined each subject’s pain threshold using standard procedures (Brooks et al.
2010). Once individual stimulation thresholds were identiﬁed the experiment started.
The computerized experiment consisted of 84 investment trials, divided into blocks
of three trials. In each block, subjects continuously expected to receive mild (strong)
electric shocks that were administered at random points in time during the block.
The experimental condition (i.e., threat of mild or strong shocks) was announced
prior to a block in three ways: (1) via a text cue on the computer screen indicating
“strong” for the threat-of-shock condition, and “mild” for the control condition, (2) via
a reminder shock that reﬂected the exact intensity of the shock(s) that could occur
throughout the block, and (3) via a speciﬁc background color on the screen that was
maintained during the block and that was consistently associated with either mild or
strong shocks (the color was counterbalanced across subjects). Thus, before each block
subjects knew exactly whether they would receive mild or strong electric shocks. The
frequency and time points of electric shocks were determined stochastically, and thus
were completely unpredictable to subjects. This strengthened the fear manipulation
(see Schmitz and Grillon 2012). Subjects knew that they could neither inﬂuence the
frequency nor the timing of the electric shocks. The length of each trial was ﬁxed at
exactly 5.5 seconds, meaning that subjects could not avoid painful shocks by making
faster decisions. We explained this in detail to the subjects in written and in oral
instructions.
In each trial, subjects could invest between 0 and 24 Swiss francs in a lottery. They
could choose among ﬁve options: invest nothing (i.e., 0 Swiss francs), invest all (i.e.,
24 Swiss francs), or invest one out of three intermediate amounts. The part of the
endowment that was not invested was put on a safe account with a zero interest
rate. Intermediate amounts varied stochastically from trial to trial in order to keep
subjects focused on the task. In each trial, the intermediate amounts were randomly
and independently drawn from three categories (low, medium, high), i.e., one amount
was selected from each category. The low category consisted of the amounts 4, 6,
and 8 Swiss francs, the medium category included the amounts 10, 12, and 14 Swiss
francs, and the high category consisted of the amounts 16, 18, and 20 Swiss francs.
So, for example, in a given trial a subject might have been facing the following ﬁve
options: 0, 4, 10, 20, or 24 Swiss francs.
The lotteries returned any integer payoﬀ between 0 Swiss francs and three times the
invested amount plus 24 Swiss francs. Subjects were presented a table illustrating the
minimum and maximum lottery payoﬀ for each possible investment level (see Table
B1).
The experiment was split into two parts (i.e., 42 trials each) which diﬀered in the
extent of ambiguity of the lotteries. In the ﬁrst part of the experiment (the ﬁrst
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Table B1: Lottery payoﬀ table
If you invest ... the lottery returns a payoﬀ
in the range of ...
0 0
4 0 - 36
6 0 - 42
8 0 - 48
10 0 - 54
12 0 - 60
14 0 - 66
16 0 - 72
18 0 - 78
20 0 - 84
24 0 - 96
42 trials), subjects only knew that they had an ambiguous 40 to 60 percent chance
to receive at least the amount invested. In addition, they knew the minimum and
maximum payoﬀs for any feasible investment level (see Table B1). At the end of
the ﬁrst part, subjects were informed how often they chose a positive investment
level in the previous 42 rounds. In addition, the degree of ambiguity was reduced by
giving subjects the following coarse information on the payoﬀ distributions for positive
investment levels:
(1) the previously realized frequency and the expected relative frequency (0.54) of
a payoﬀ that is lower than their investment;
(2) the previously realized frequency and the expected relative frequency (0.35) of
a payoﬀ that is zero;
(3) the previously realized frequency and the expected relative frequency (0.33) of
a payoﬀ that is larger than their investment;
(4) the previously realized frequency and the expected relative frequency (0.16) of
a payoﬀ that is larger than 1.5  investment.
This information was presented to the subjects both numerically and with bar charts
at the end of the ﬁrst part. After they received this information, they faced another 42
trials (second part). Recall that the information given at the end of part 1 lowered the
overall investment level but did not aﬀect the impact of fear on investment levels. The
impact remained constant across part 1 and part 2. Thus, the additional information
did not have an impact on the fear eﬀect.
To identify the impact of the threat-of-shock treatment on investment decisions, we
estimated the following regression model using OLS:22
yit = 0 + 1Threatit + 2PSit + 3NPSit + 4Iit + 5Xi + it; (2)
where the dependent variable is the share invested (in percent of the endowment)
22The results remain the same if we use a Tobit model instead.
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into a lottery by individual i in trial t. Threatit is a dummy for the threat-of-shock
treatment, i.e., the condition we implemented to induce fear. Iit is a dummy for
decisions made in the second part, i.e., after providing coarse information about the
expected payoﬀ frequencies. PSit and NPSit are dummy variables for the actual ex-
perience of either painful or non-painful electrical stimulation within an interval of 4
seconds prior to the display of the choice scenario and until subjects made a choice.
We examined shorter and longer intervals ranging from 2 to 10 seconds; the results
remain unchanged. Xi is a vector that controls for age and gender. Standard errors
are corrected for clustering at the individual level. The estimation results are reported
in Table B2 and indicate that the threat of painful shocks signiﬁcantly reduced invest-
ments (p < 0.001, t-test). Interestingly, it is only the threat of random shocks that
aﬀects risk taking because the actual experience of electric shocks had no impact on
subsequent behavior (PS: p = 0.754 and NPS: p = 0.972, t-tests). Finally, revealing
coarse information about the expected payoﬀ frequencies decreased investments (p <
0.001, t-test), but column (2) shows that the interaction term between the treatment
and information dummy is insigniﬁcant (p = 0.482, t-test), which means that the
fear-of-pain eﬀect does not depend on the degree of ambiguity.
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Table B2: Regression analysis of fear induction experiment
Dependent variable: Share invested in risky asset
(1) (2)
Threat of shock -4.273*** -3.794***
(1.234) (1.189)
Information -6.353*** -5.869**
(2.459) (2.567)
Threat of shock  Information -0.967
(1.376)
Painful shock 0.577 0.584
(1.843) (1.841)
Non-painful shock 0.061 -0.048
(1.762) (1.763)
Age 1.720 1.720
(1.382) (1.382)
Male 4.628 4.628
(6.540) (6.540)
Constant 14.319 14.077
(29.118) (29.041)
N 3399 3399
This table reports OLS coeﬃcient estimates (robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the
individual level in parentheses). The dependent variable in both columns is the share invested in a
lottery (in percent of the endowment). “Threat of shock” is a dummy for the painful treat-of-shock
treatment, i.e., the condition we implemented to induce fear by exposing subjects to the threat of
unpredictable, randomly administered painful electric shocks. “Information” is a dummy for decisions
made in the second part of the experiment, i.e., after subjects received coarse information about the
expected payoﬀ frequencies. “Painful shock” and “Non-painful shock” are dummy variables for the
actual experience of either painful or non-painful electrical stimulation within an interval of 4 seconds
prior to the display of the choice scenario and until subjects made a choice. “Age” is a subject’s age
in years, and “Male” is a gender dummy. The number of observations is less than the total number
of choice scenarios (3444) because some subjects did not respond within the allotted 5.5 second time
limit and one subject ended the experiment early. Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.001.
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